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Regulating Nature in Law Following 
Weak Anthropocentrism: Lessons for 
Intellectual Property Regimes and 
Environmental Ethics
Rosa Maria Ballardini* and Corinna Casi**
Abstract: Reversing the ecological degradation that is rapidly spreading globally requires radical action 
at various levels of society. In this transition, the legal framework could create pathways for ethically 
sound, yet effective, techno-socio-economic developments. Most legal systems are failing, as they are built 
on ‘strong’ anthropocentrism, where humans’ interests are prioritized over those of nature. This approach 
is particularly prominent in some fields of private law, such as intellectual property regimes. This article 
focuses on the alternative, namely to create a ‘rights of nature’ (RoN) framework in order to curb and, ide-
ally, reverse the continuing environmental decline. In this regard, we argue that to better respect nature, 
law should follow ‘weak’ anthropocentrism, identified in this paper as an approach that assigns higher 
intrinsic value to humans but also recognizes intrinsic value in non-human nature. To this end, an in-
clusive concept of ‘nature’ that encompasses both humans and non-human elements of nature, and where 
non-human elements of nature also become legal subjects with a degree of legal capacity, could provide a 
viable alternative. We concretize this vision via elaborating on how such an approach could divert, in par-
ticular, traditionally ‘strong’ anthropocentric regimes such as (intellectual) private property law towards 
achieving more eco-friendly outcomes.
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1. Introduction
Ecological	 degradation,	 ranging	 from	 loss	 of	
species	 to	 climate	 change,	 is	 rapidly	 spread-
ing	globally	at	a	systemic	level.1	Scenarios	like	
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Programme	 claims	 that	with	 the	 coronavirus	
Intergovernmental	 Science-Policy	 Platform	
on	Biodiversity	and	Ecosystem	Services.	E.	S.	
Brondizio,	 J.	 Settele,	 S.	 Díaz,	 and	H.	 T.	Ngo	
(editors).	IPBES	secretariat,	Bonn,	Germany.
2.	 Crutzen	&	Stoermer	2000.
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(COVID-19)	 outbreak	 in	 2019–2020,	 nature	 is	
sending	us	 a	message.	Humans	have	put	 too	
much	pressure	on	the	natural	environment.	As	

















move	 is	 that	while	 recent	 decades	 have	 seen	
the	adoption	of	a	growing	number	of	environ-
mental	 treaties,	 laws	and	regulations,	existing	
models	 of	 protection	 for	 non-human	 natural	
elements	are	failing,	as	they	do	not	fully	reflect	
the	 shift	 needed	 to	 curb	 and,	 ideally,	 reverse	
the	 continued	 environmental	 decline.	 This	 is	
primarily	a	consequence	of	the	‘strong’	anthro-
pocentric	view	in	law.
Even	 though	 ‘strong’	 anthropocentrism	 is	
a	typical	characteristic	of	the	legal	system	as	a	
whole,	 ‘strong’	anthropocentric	 types	of	prac-
tices	 are	 particularly	 evident	 in	 private	 law	
regimes,	 such	 as	 intellectual	 property	 rights	
(IPR).5	Amongst	 the	many	 critiques,	 there	 is	
currently	 a	 rising	 concern	 that	 our	 (Western)	
types	of	private	property	(including	intellectual	
property)	 regimes	have	 failed	 to	 foster	mean-
ingful	 development	 of	 societies	 with	 special	















of	 nature’	 (RoN)	 framework.7	 We	 conceptu-
























6.	 Harari	 2019;	 Pihlajarinne	 &	 Ballardini	 2020.	
Moreover,	as	Piketty	points	out,	 ‘human-cen-
tred’	 in	 private	 property	 regimes	 has	meant	
‘not	 for	 all	 humans’,	 as	 private	 property	 has	
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by	 focusing	on	 the	 legal	 framework	of	 (Euro-
pean)	private	property	 regimes	 such	 as	 intel-
lectual	property	(IP)	rights.	The	reason	for	this	





whether	 a	move	 such	 as	 creating	RoN	based	
on	weak	anthropocentrism	could	help	to	better	
strike	 a	 balance	 between	 exclusive	 (humans’)	
rights	to	private	property,	relevant	fundamen-
tal	(human)	rights	and	respect	for	non-human	






















tric	 principles,	 their	 actual	 implementation	 is	
















able	 to	better	 respect	nature,	a	 ‘weak’	anthro-





this	 to	 occur,	 an	 inclusive	 concept	 of	 ‘nature’	
that	 encompasses	 both	 humans	 and	 non-hu-
man	elements	of	nature	and	where	non-human	
elements	of	nature	 also	become	 legal	 subjects	
with	a	degree	of	legal	capacity,	could	provide	





2. Nature and the Legal Framework: 
Persons and Nonpersons











dictions,	 animals	 are	 treated	 as	 nonpersons.	
See	e.g.	Kurki	2019.
Regulating Nature in Law Following Weak Anthropocentrism: Lessons for Intellectual Property Regimes …
Side 20 Retfærd | Nr. 4 | 2020
ern	legal	systems.10	Legal	personality	(or	legal	
personhood)	 is	 a	prerequisite	 for	 legal	 capac-
ity,	which	has	traditionally	been	defined	as	the	
ability	to	exercise	one’s	own	rights	and	duties.11





1)	 being	 a	 human	being	 (although	 this	 is	 not	
always	made	 explicit,	 it	 is	 a	 general	 tacit	 as-
sumption	in	most	jurisdictions),	2)	being	born	





















juristic,	 artificial,	 or	 fictitious.	 To	 avoid	 con-
fusion,	here	we	only	 refer	 to	 judicial	persons	


























beings	 have	 intrinsic	 value	whereas	 non-hu-

























sonhood	 comprises	 a	 cluster	 of	 rights	 and/or	
15.	 Kurki	2019,	13.
16.	 Kurki	2019.
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other	 than	 humans,	 are	 considered	 as	 non-






vironment.	As	 noted	 above,	 this	 approach	 is	
particularly	predominant	 in	 legal	fields	 regu-










us	 to	discuss	 the	key	questions	of	 this	article,	
namely	whether	there	is	a	need	in	our	legal	sys-
tem	 to	move	 away	 from	anthropocentrism	 in	
17.	 Wise	2010.
18.	 Kurki	2019.







why	 it	 is	 desirable	 to	 change	 this	 setting	 and	
enable	 non-human	 elements	 of	 nature	 to	 join	
the	‘special’	category	of	legal	subjects.
3. Respecting Non-Human Elements of 
Nature in Private Property Regimes
As	previously	mentioned,	even	though	strong	
anthropocentrism	is	deeply	ingrained	into	the	
legal	 system	as	 a	whole,	 the	 approaches	 and	
practices	 followed	 in	 some	 fields	 of	 private	











It	 is	 well	 known	 that	 one	 of	 the	 biggest	
societal	 challenges	 of	 today	 is	 how	 to	 trans-
form	our	 economic	 and	 innovation	 structures	
to	 more	 environmentally	 sustainable	 ones.	
Notably,	Article	10	of	the	Paris	Agreement	on	
Climate	Change	emphasizes	the	importance	of	
innovation	 by	 stating	 that:	 “Accelerating,	 en-
couraging	 and	 enabling	 innovation	 is	 critical	
for	 an	 effective,	 long-term	global	 response	 to	
climate	 change	 […]”.23	 Innovation	 aspects	 for	
sustainable	development	are	also	emphasized	
in	the	United	Nations’	17	sustainable	develop-
ment	 goals	 (SDGs)	 that	 include	 aspects	 such	
as	 industry,	 innovation	 and	 infrastructure.	 In	
other	words,	 regulation	of	 innovation	 ecosys-
tems	holds	significant	potential	 for	advancing	
developments	 that	 are	more	 respectful	 of	 the	
planet.	Although	neither	 the	Paris	Agreement	
22.	 See	 “What	 is	 intellectual	 property”,	 WIPO	
Publications	No.	450	(E).
23.	 See	 Paris	Agreement,	 United	Nations	 Treaty	
Collection,	8	July	2016,	Art.	10.5.
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Functioning	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 (TFEU)	




as	 a	means	 of	 steering	 the	 interpretation	 and	




approach	 for	 achieving	 sustainability	 is	 still	











this	 is	but	one	of	 the	consequences	of	 the	key	
theories	 currently	used	 in	most	Western-type	





25.	 Consolidated	 version	 of	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	









2.	 	Labour	 theory,	 which	 recognizes	 and	 re-
wards	individuals	for	their	work.
3.	 	Personality	 theory,	 which	 acknowledges	

























illustrative.	 In	 this	 dispute	 the	 copyright	 sta-
tus	of	selfies	taken	by	Celebes	macaques	from	
a	national	 park	 in	North	 Sulawesi,	 Indonesia	
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minutes	 and	produced	hundreds	 of	 pictures,	
three	of	which	were	spectacular.	Slater	promptly	








monkey,	 claiming	 that	 they	had	copyright	on	
the	selfies.36	At	the	end	of	the	day,	the	disputes	
were	resolved	with	the	judge	declaring	that	the	






eligibility	 criteria	 in	 copyright	 law,	 especially	
the	 criteria	 of	 originality.	Moreover,	 this	 also	
relates	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 animals	 like	monkeys	
do	not	have	legal	capacity	since	they	are	‘non-












to	 “translate”	 the	music	 produced	 by	 plants	
into	human-audible	sounds.	As	with	the	case	
in	 the	 monkey	 selfie,	 should	 anyone	 try	 to	
claim	 copyright	 on	 such	pieces	 of	plants-cre-














(usually	 tied	 to	 profitable	 outcomes)	 prevail,	




4. Rights of Nature: Environmental Ethics 
Perspectives






















that	 period	 the	 birth	 of	 environmental	 ethics	
38.	 Pihlajarinne	&	Ballardini	2020.
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in	1972	during	the	court	case	Sierra Club vs. C.B. 
Morton.40 The	Sierra	Club,	one	of	the	most	influ-
ential	 grassroots	 environmental	 organizations	
in	 the	USA,	 opposed	 a	 plan	 by	Walt	Disney	
Enterprises	to	build	a	ski	resort	in	the	Mineral	
King	Valley	 of	 Sequoia	National	 Forest,	Cali-
fornia.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 legal	 scholar	Stone41 
argued	that	non-human	entities	in	nature,	such	
as	oceans,	forests	and	trees,	should	have	legal	
rights.	 In	Stone’s	model,	 the	 interests	of	 these	
natural	elements	could	be	represented	in	courts	
of	 law	by	 trustees	or	guardians.42	 Some	years	
later,	 the	philosopher	Rolston	 introduced	 the	
idea	 of	 ascribing	 intrinsic	 value	 to	 ecological	
wholes	 or	 collective	 entities	 such	 as	 species.43 
According	to	Rolston,	if	something	has	intrinsic	
value,	it	means	that	it	has	a	value	as	such,	as	an	
end	 in	 itself	 and	 therefore	 should	have	 rights	
of	 its	own.44	This	view	contrasts	the	approach	
where	nature	is	considered	as	being	of	purely	





needs.	Legal	 rights	are	written	 in	 legal	 codes;	
for	each	legal	right	there	is	a	law	and,	when	a	
law	is	infringed,	there	are	consequences.47	Moral	
rights,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 are	 not	 codified	 in	
39.	 Brennan	&	Lo	2015.

















agreed	 that	 having	 “intrinsic	 value	 generates	
a prima facie	 direct	moral	duty	 on	 the	part	 of	
moral	agents	to	protect	it”,49	or	to	abstain	from	
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Many	 arguments	 are	 available	 to	 support	
the	 RoN.	Among	 these,	 animal	 rights	 advo-
cates	 claim	 that	 because	 animals	 are	 sentient	
beings	‒	meaning	that	they	have	the	capacity	to	
suffer	and	feel	pain	‒	they	should	have	moral	
standing.	Hence,	 they	promote	 a	 hierarchical	
RoN	 that	 includes	 only	humans	 and	non-hu-
man	animals,	based	on	an	individualistic	view.	










and	 adopt	 a	 different	 principle	 based	 on	 the	
simple	acknowledgment	that	“non-human	spe-
cies	 exist	 ‘in	 their	own	 rights’…”	 intrinsically	








non-human,	 have	 an	 intrinsic	 value	 in	 virtue	





























the	other	hand,	 ascribes	 intrinsic	value	 to	 the	
whole	of	nature	even	 though	greater	 intrinsic	
value	 is	 assigned	 to	humans	 than	 to	 nature’s	
non-human	components.63








sacrifice	 human	 lives	 to	 save	non-human	na-
ture.	We	are	also	aware	of	the	blurry	line	sepa-
rating	strong	and	weak	anthropocentrism,	but	
we	 think	 that	 embracing	weak	 anthropocen-
trism	is	a	 further	step	 that	can	be	accepted	 in	
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man	needs	but	it	can,	on	the	other	hand,	enrich	
human	 experience	 for	 its	 aesthetic,	 ecological	
and	recreational	value.
In	 accordance	 with	 Norton,	 for	 instance,	
lessons	learnt	from	non-human	nature	provide	
essential	 guidance	 in	 constructing	 a	 rational	
worldview.65	 Non-human	 nature	 can	 also	 be	
“an	 important	 source	 of	 inspiration	 in	 value	
formation”,66	 contributing	 to	 human	 quality	





















A	world	 in	which	humans	have	 a	 higher	
recognition	 of	 non-human	 nature,	 for	 which	
we	care	and	ascribe	an	intrinsic	value,	is	better	
than	the	opposite.	Similarly	to	the	philosopher	













5. Non-Human Nature as a Subject of 
Rights: The Story Thus Far
Legal	 personhood	 is	 not	 engraved	 in	 stone,	
while	 the	scope	of	 this	conception	 is	variable.	
The	rules	related	to	legal	personhood	and	legal	
















the	 concept	of	 legal	personhood	or	 extending	
rights	and/or	duties,	is	to	better	protect	some-
thing	or	 someone	 that	would	otherwise	be	 in	
worse	off	positions	from	the	 legal	standpoint.	
The	question	we	 ask	here	 is	whether	 there	 is	
a	 need	 to	 award	 some	 degree	 of	 legal	 capa-







types	 of	 framework	have	 already	been	 estab-
lished,	even	though	in	other	fields	of	law.	The	
purpose	 is	 twofold:	 on	 the	 one	hand	we	 aim	
to	shed	light	on	the	structure	(anthropocentric	
or	 non-anthropocentric)	 followed	 thus	 far	 for	
70.	 Finkelman	2012.
71.	 Fede	1992.
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legal	 frameworks	have	been	 created	with	 the	
aim	of	recognizing	the	value	of	non-human	na-
ture,	via	turning	it	into	a	legal	person	assigned	
various	 degrees	 of	 legal	 capacity.	 Generally,	
these	 structures	 have	 emerged	 in	 countries	
which	host	relatively	robust	and	vocal	 iIndig-























recognized	 as	 belonging	 to	 nature	 are:	 1)	 the	
right	to	integral	respect	for	its	existence;	2)	the	
right	to	maintenance	and	regeneration	of	its	life	















as	an	alternative	 solution	 that	 fosters	 sustain-
ability	 and	 confronts	 the	 strongly	 anthropo-
centric	neoliberal	model.73	 It	 has	been	 argued	
that	with	 this	pioneer	move	Ecuador	 took	 an	








thought,	Knauss	 claimed	 that	 introducing	 the	
RoN	in	the	Ecuadorian	Constitution	was	a	move	
to	 foster	 human	 stewardship	 of	 the	planet	 in	
the	age	of	 the	Anthropocene.74	Moreover,	 this	
example	creates	only	constitutional	rights,	not	
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It	was	argued	 that	 this	would	offer	 the	Ecua-
dorian	people	the	opportunity	of	good	living,	
or	‘vivir	bien’	wisdom.76	Moreover,	looking	at	































where	 RoN	 have	 been	 established	 through	
specific	laws,	an	example	is	represented	by	the	












by	 two	 guardians:	 one	 from	 the	 iIndigenous	
community	(Whanganui	Iwi)	and	one	from	the	
government.	By	law	each	of	these	guardians	is	






the	 worldview	 of	 iIndigenous	 people.82	 The	
survival	and	wellbeing	of	the	Whanganui	Iwi,	
a	Māori	people,	heavily	depends	on	the	homon-
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Ganges	 river	 including	 the	Yamuna	 river	and	
the	Gangotri	 and	Yamunotri	 glaciers	 and	 “all	
their	 tributaries,	 streams,	 every	natural	water	
flowing	 with	 flow	 continuously	 or	 intermit-
tently	of	 these	rivers’’	as “living	entities”	and	





these	 ecosystems	were	 “breathing,	 living	 and	








This	 case	 can	be	 seen	as	an	 integration	of	
the	 Ecuadorian	 and	New	Zealand	 case	 since	





87.	 See	Uttarakhand	High	Court,	Mohd. Salim vs. 
State of Utturakhand & Others	2017.





























As	we	have	 seen,	 all	 three	 countries	have	
had	 Indigenous	 pressure	 groups,	 creating	
more	 reasons	 to	 acknowledge	 RoN	 than	 in	
other	 contexts.90	This	 in	 turn	has	 fostered	use	





prevailing	 tool	 for	 managing	 the	 rights	 and	
duties	 of	 legal	 persons	 that	 cannot	 represent	
themselves	in	court,	such	as	minors.	It	is	enough	
to	read	parts	of	the	Indian	judges’	reasoning	to	
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“A	juristic	person	can	be	any	subject	matter	
other	than	a	human	being	to	which	the	law	















tion	 for	 their	 enforcement	 since	 the	move	 of	







noted	 that	 none	of	 these	 solutions	has	meant	
that	private	law	(for	example,	regulation	of	pri-
vate	property)	 has	 actually	 changed.	 In	 other	
words,	 the	 framework	 in	 which	 private	 law	
functions	has	not	really	been	affected.
6. Raising Attention to Non-Human 
Nature’s Interests Through Weak 
Anthropocentrism
As	 the	 above	 analysis	 shows,	 reliance	 by	 the	
Western	 legal	 system	 on	 ‘strong’	 anthropo-
centrism,	combined	with	a	main	focus	on	eco-
nomic	efficiency,	has	caused	challenges	for	the	
legal	 framework	 (and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 for	





property	 regimes	 like	 IPR.92	Attempts	 to	 step	
aside	 from	 strong	 anthropocentrism	 towards	
a	 non-anthropocentric	 approach	 to	 law	when	
dealing	with	 environmental	 issues	 are	 under	







the	national	 economy	and	 subsistence,	 led	 to	











in	 general,	 after	 all?	 As	 already	 mentioned,	
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anthropocentric	perspective,	where	non-human	
nature	 has	 intrinsic	 worth,	 in	 the	 belief	 that	






























ally	 kept	 separate	 (with	 the	 former	 generally	
being	 subordinated	 to	 the	 latter).	 The	 case	 of	
Ecuador	well	illustrates	this.	While	judges	have	
played	 a	 truly	 significant	 role	 in	 interpreting	







nature.96	 Indeed,	 this	 shows	how	 the	human/
non-human	nature	division	in	law	is	problem-
atic	 in	 terms	 of	 also	 prioritizing	 the	 interests	
of	 the	 environment.	 This	 is	 the	main	 reason	
for	 failure	 and	why	 the	 natural	 environment	









a	 legal	 system	 that	better	 respects	 the	natural	





humans	 and	 non-human	 elements	 under	 the	
same	umbrella.
In	 this	 transition,	 the	 following	 guiding	
principles	could	be	useful:
1.	 	Human	beings	should	see	more	in	non-hu-
man	nature	 than	 a	mere	means	 to	human	
ends.
2.	 	A	 holistic	 umbrella	 for	 redefining	 nature	
(encompassing	 both	 human	 and	 non-hu-
man	nature)	 in	 law	means	providing	legal	





capacity	 to	 limit	 human	 action	 damaging	
them.	Recognizing	non-human	parts	of	na-
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of	 these	 legal	 instruments	have	 any	 influence	
on	private	law	and,	thus,	on	market	behaviour.	
Additionally,	measures	that	attempt	to	channel	







for	 reconceptualizing	 important	property	 law	
pillars,	such	as	the	pillar	of	the	person	and	of	
property,	 in	 a	way	 less	 dependent	 on	 strong	
anthropocentrism	and	utilitarianism	with	their	





















This	 proposition	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	
same	legal	status	and/or	legal	capacity	should	
be	granted	to	humans	as	well	as	to	non-human	




be	 built	 in	 accordance	with	 this	 vision.	 Some	
such	frameworks	have	already	appeared	in	the	
literature.	Above	we	 have	 already	 discussed	




sonhood	 to	 artificial	 intelligence.98	Moreover,	









envisioned	 in	 order	 to	 represent	 the	 interests	
and	rights	of	non-human	parts	of	nature	(in	the	
same	way	as	in	some	of	the	cases	presented	in	
this	 paper).	 This	 structure	 could	well	 be	 jus-
tified	 by	 our	proposed	weak	 anthropocentric	
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respect	 for	 the	 natural	 environment	 through	




of	 legal	 personhood	or	 extending	 rights	 and/
or	duties	is	traditionally	the	most	effective	way	
to	 better	 protect	 something	 or	 someone	 that	
would	otherwise	be	 in	a	worse	position	 from	
the	 legal	viewpoint.	 Importantly,	 if	 the	aim	is	
to	 acknowledge	 a	 concept	 of	 nature	which	 is	
inclusive	of	both	humans	and	non-human	enti-
ties,	as	we	here	propose	(principle	1),	a	certain	
degree	 of	 legal	 capacity	 (even	 if	 there	would	














this	 proposition	would	 align	with	 a	 growing	
















not	 necessarily	 mean	 that,	 for	 example,	 IPR	
should	 be	 granted	 to	 non-humans	 (e.g.	mon-


















103.	 Alexander	&	Peñalver	 2012.	 See	 also	Alexan-
der	2018;	Akkermans	2019.
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We	 acknowledge	 that	 this	 might	 be	 yet	
another	 attempt	 to	 ‘anthropomorphize’	 the	
natural	 environment.	 Yet,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	
the	proposed	overarching	umbrella	frame	like	
an	 inclusive	 concept	 of	 ‘nature’	 as	 presented	




parts	 of	 nature	 are	 fully	 recognized	 for	 their	






eminent	 climate	 scientists	 are	 showing	 that	
“absolutely	immense	changes”	are	required	to	
deliver	a	sustainable	future	and	avoid	the	col-





form	 the	EU	 economy	 and	 society	 to	 a	more	
environmentally	 sustainable	 model,	 where	
sustainable	innovation	plays	a	central	role	(al-
though	very	 little	 is	mentioned	 about	private	
law	and	market	regulation).106	Yet	the	claim	is	
104.	 Even	 though	 these	 types	 of	 issue	 have	 been	
discussed	in	IPR	in	the	context	of	human	rights	
‒	 e.g.,	 freedom	of	 speech,	 or	 access	 to	health	
‒	the	discourse	on	law	and	environmental	sus-































legal	 system,	 our	 analysis	 shows	 that	despite	












cil,	 the	Council,	 the	 European	Economic	 and	
Social	 Committee	 and	 the	 Committee	 of	 the	
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are	 ontologically	 different	 and	 distinct,	 and	
where	humans	occupy	a	position	of	superiority,	
it	 is	easier	to	objectify	non-human	nature	and	
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